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I. INTRODUCTION
In Henry IV Part II, William Shakespeare's protagonist King
Henry IV lamented, "Uneasy lies the head that wears the crown."1 To
the casual observer, these pithy words remain among the more accu-
rate statements regarding the burdens of leadership. These burdens
continue to exist today in the Office of the President of the United
States (except for the crown, of course). The burdens placed upon the
Office of the President are created explicitly by the Constitution of the
United States of America. 2 These burdens, however, exist implicitly as
well.3 The use of these implied powers in protecting against leaks of
confidential information is the subject of this paper.
1. William Shakespeare, Henry IV Part I, Act 3 Scene 1 Line 32.
2. See U.S. CONST. art. II.
3. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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In the past few years, Wikileaks4 has promulgated embarrass-
ing and politically damaging diplomatic, military and intelligence
information regarding the United States and its interests abroad.5
The information distributed by Wikileaks, and its founder Julian As-
sange, caused controversy and remains an ever-evolving topic. 6
Utilizing Justice Robert Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown
Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer7 this paper will show how the President
can use several Congressional acts to solve the Wikileaks problem.
Part I of this paper will discuss the development of the
Wikileaks situation. It will discuss the unique nature of the website,
its stated goals and the various technological protections that were
built into Wikileaks. It will also discuss the major weakness in the
website - its dependence on leaked information - that the President
can exploit in order to render the website ineffective in achieving its
goals. It will also discuss the various legal challenges to Wikileaks and
how those legal challenges have left Wikileaks immune to direct at-
tack. Part I will then give a brief introduction of the Youngstown case,
particularly Justice Jackson's concurring opinion. Finally, Part I will
discuss the "State Secrets" doctrine: a procedural safeguard designed
to prevent sensitive information from being subject to discovery.8
Part II will discuss how the President can find authority within
the National Security Act (NSA) to restrict the flow of information into
Wikileaks and remain at the highest level of executive power discussed
in Jackson's concurrence. However, this power will be limited by the
scope of the NSA, which primarily addresses Department of Defense
intelligence organizations.9 Part III will discuss how the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), coupled with the NSA's silence on diplomatic
information and omission of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
will place the President's authority to act with regard to those agencies
in either Jackson's "zone of twilight" or "lowest ebb".10
Part IV will discuss how Congress can alter the NSA and FOIA
to grant the President authority to exhibit greater control over the flow
of information outside of the government. Finally, Part V will discuss
how the State Secrets doctrine should prevent any litigation to curb
4. See www.wikileaks.org.
5. What is Wikileaks?, BBC NEWS (Dec. 7, 2010), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/technology-10757263.
6. Id.
7. Supra note 3 at 634.
8. See discussion supra. p. 15.
9. See discussion supra. p. 19.
10. See discussion supra. p. 24.
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such authority from ever reaching judgment by depriving a challenging
party of standing.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Before beginning the analysis, it is important to understand the
characters that play a role in said analysis. Following in the Shakes-
pearean vein of the introduction, a dramatis personae" of the
characters to be involved must be presented. The characters include:
(A) Wikileaks.org, (B) the Youngstown decision, and (C) the "State
Secrets" doctrine. Additional characters will be revealed as appropri-
ate throughout the analysis.
A. Wikileaks
From the outside, Wikileaks possesses very lofty ideals. In
2006, an Australian, Julian Assange, and several like-minded people1 2
from across the world created the website, www.wikileaks.org.13 The
purpose of the site is to allow "whistle-blowers and journalists who
have been censored to get material out to the public." 14 Wikileaks de-
scribes itself as the instrument by which the citizens of the world can
satisfy their need for government openness and transparency. 15
Through this transparency, Wikileaks hopes to reduce corruption, im-
prove government and strengthen democracy.- 6 Wikileaks seeks to
provide greater scrutiny of government activities."7 The site "achieves"
this goal by providing "a forum for the entire global community to re-
lentlessly examine any document for its credibility, plausibility,
veracity and validity." 8
While the above goals are abstract in nature, a more practical
and tangible goal exists, the news gathering function. The ideals of
11. The dramatis personae is a list of important characters, most often used in the
beginning of published stage plays. See "dramatis personae." Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary. 2011. http://merriam-webster.com (13 Mar. 2011).
12. The website itself claims a list of founders including: "Chinese dissidents,
journalists, mathematicians and startup company technologists, from the US, Taiwan,
Europe, Australia and South Africa." See http://www.wikileaks.org/wiki/Wikileaks:About.
13. Profile: Wikileaks founder Julian Assange, BBC NEWS (May 30, 2011), available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-11047811.
14. Supra note 5.
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transparency and greater scrutiny can be achieved through a variety of
means; leaked documents are only one such means. The news gather-
ing goal, on the other hand, is always visible on the website. For
Wikileaks, the news gathering function is a way to "make it easier for
quality journalists to do their job of getting important information out
to the community."19 Therefore, Wikileaks gathers leaked documents
in order to provide journalists and other interested parties with the
tools to report the news, even the news that governments actively seek
to keep confidential.
Beyond the goals of Wikileaks, the form and function of the
website are equally important to understand. As the name suggests,
Wikileaks operates very similarly to the online encyclopedia
Wikipedia. 2 0 The process begins with the two most important aspects
of the site's existence, users and information. 2 1 A user uploads a docu-
ment to the website and specifies the language and the country (or
industry) of origin. 22 The document then enters a queue that obscures
the time and date of the upload. 2 3 The document leaves the queue,
backs up to internal backup servers and publishes. 24 Once published,
the document is subject to peer review, analysis and comment. 25 The
users of the website act as the editors, with misleading or otherwise
irresponsible postings to the site fixed by other users, similar to
Wikipedia.26
Wikileaks prides itself on anonymity; one of the main aspects of
its function.27 Wikileaks creates a few layers of security. 28 The first
layer exists at the upload level. 2 9 Wikileaks uses various technologies
to encrypt the uploaded documents, thus providing anonymity and un-
traceability. 30 Wikileaks employs a modified version of "Tor" among its
encryption techniques.3 1 Tor seeks to protect users from "traffic analy-
19. Id.
20. See http://www.wikipedia.org/.










31. The emphasis on Tor contained herein is purely for illustrative purposes; it is not
the only technology Wikileaks claims to use. Wikileaks also uses modified versions of other
technologies, including: MediaWiki, Open SSL, FreeNet, PGP and software designed by
Wikileaks. See Id.
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sis", a common method of internet surveillance, 32 which focuses on the
header contained within information uploaded to a website such as
Wikileaks. 33 Tor enables a user to send data from his computer to its
destination by using a system of relays to move the file along through a
network en route to its ultimate destination.34 At each leg of the relay,
a "Tor node", only knows the information sent to it from the previous
node.35 Once the information arrives at its destination, the relays navi-
gated should prevent internet eavesdroppers from using traffic
analysis to link the source and destination.36 In the Wikileaks context,
a user can upload a document and send it to Wikileaks along the Tor
nodes with relative security that it will remain anonymous. On the
second layer, Wikileaks's main servers are housed in Sweden hosted by
ISP PeReQuito. 37 By keeping its servers in a friendly jurisdiction,
Wikileaks can operate as fully as any other website without being sub-
ject to the increased levels of scrutiny that it would likely receive in
other jurisdictions. Finally, the document enters the third layer: the
queue. The queue obscures the time and date of publication, thus
preventing any would-be investigators from obtaining this valuable in-
formation to determine the source of any leaks.38 With so many layers
of protection, Wikileaks allows its users to upload and use the pub-
lished leaks with relative peace of mind that their anonymity remains
intact.
The function of Wikileaks is but a small portion of the
Wikileaks story. Another equally important question must be asked:
what has Wikileaks done to garner enough attention to be the subject
of this essay? Although the website first aired in December of 2006,
Wikileaks avoided controversy for a few years.39 Several postings did
cause a minor stir during the initial years of Wikileaks' existence, 40
including: a posting of the Standard Operating Procedures for Camp
Delta, which detailed restrictions experienced by prisoners at Guanta-
namo Bay and a screenshot of former Vice Presidential candidate
32. Tor:Overview, TOR, available at https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.




37. PeReQuito (PRQ) is also known for hosting the file sharing website The Pirate Bay.
Although Wikileaks has never expressly stated their reasons for hosting out of PRQ, the
words of PRQ itself shed some light, "If it is legal in Sweden, we will host it, and keep it up
regardless of any pressure to take it down." See supra note 5.
38. Supra note 15.
39. Supra note 5.
40. Id.
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Sarah Palin's e-mail inbox, address book, and pictures during the 2008
Presidential Election.41 In April of 2010, however, Wikileaks burst
into the news by publishing a video of a 2007 operation in Baghdad,
Iraq, showing a United States Apache helicopter killing at least 12 peo-
ple, two of whom were Reuters journalists. 4 2 In October of 2010,
Wikileaks posted nearly 400,000 secret US military logs detailing oper-
ations in Iraq.43 Soon after the Iraq logs were uploaded, Wikileaks
released 90,000 classified military records containing the military
strategy used in Afghanistan.4 4 Among the most infamous articles
Wikileaks published were thousands of gossip-styled diplomatic cables
from the US State Department.4 5 As a result of these leaks, Wikileaks
has gained the ire of many governments around the world. 46
Wikileaks has deflected legal challenges to enjoin the website
from publishing such damaging information. 4 7 The most prominent
example of such legal deflection comes from Bank Julius Baer & Co.
LTD. v. Wikileaks.4 8 In Bank Julius Baer, the plaintiff sought to en-
join Wikileaks and a co-defendant, Dynadot Co., from publishing its
the plaintiffs bank documents. 4 9 The plaintiff initially succeeded, with
the injunction going unopposed until late briefs were filed contesting
the injunction.50 The Court still ordered a later hearing, in spite of
Wikileaks' and the co-defendant's failure to meet the deadlines.5 1 Af-
ter the hearing, the US District Court for the Northern District of
California, in what was probably dicta 52, stated that the injunction
against Wikileaks, or companies working with the website, violated the





45. Id. For examples of the "gossip" within the State Department, see, At a glance:
Wikileaks cables, BBC NEWS, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-
11914040. (e.g. While describing Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi as "feckless" and
"vain", the State Department further stated, "Berlusconi admires [Russian PM Vladimir]
Putin's macho, decisive, and authoritarian governing style, which the Italian PM believes
matches his own." Many of the cables are similarly embarrassing).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 535 F. Supp. 2d 980 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
49. Id. at 982.
50. Id. at 983.
51. Id.
52. Before discussing the merits of an injunction, the Court expressed great concern
(without making a ruling) that it lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction over the matter
because both parties in the suit are arguably foreign entities. Thus, the United States
would lack jurisdiction. See Id. at 984.
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Amendment.53 The Court further stated that an injunction would be
ineffective in most situations because with Wikileaks "the cat is [al-
ready] out of the bag."54 Wikileaks claims they have successfully
defended over 100 other legal challenges.5 5 Despite Wikileaks' proce-
dural failures, courts have been willing to give Wikileaks a chance to
be heard. Once heard, courts, such as the Bank Julius Baer court,
have been unwilling to grant injunctions for fear of committing consti-
tutional violations.56 In addition, an injunction would fail for lack of
efficacy.5 7 Thus, Wikileaks remains well protected from direct legal
challenge.
The final characteristic of Wikileaks is its dependence on user
uploads.58 It is unlikely Wikileaks will ever acknowledge this depen-
dence, but without a user, information cannot publish. It follows that
without information, Wikileaks has nothing to post onto its website,
and with nothing posted to the website, Wikileaks fails to realize its
goals.59 Therefore, any legal act to cut off the flow of information from
the uploader into Wikileaks will most likely render Wikileaks ineffec-
tive. (emphasis added). Further, any act taken by the President to
confront the leaks should target the ability to upload information.
B. Youngstown
In order to determine how the President can halt the flow of
information into Wikileaks, one must understand the President's
power and its source. The most widely accepted analysis of Presiden-
tial power derives from Justice Robert Jackson's concurring opinion in
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer.60 In Youngstown, on the
eve of a labor strike in the nation's steel industry, President Harry S.
Truman promulgated Executive Order No. 10340; directing the Secre-
tary of Commerce to take possession of most of the steel mills and
continue their operation.61 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company, one
of the steel companies named in President Truman's Order, took issue
53. Id. at 984-85.
54. Id. at 985. (alteration in original)
55. Supra note 5.
56. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), Board of Education v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853 (1982), see also Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219 (6th
Cir. 1996).
57. 535 F.Supp.2d 980 at 985.
58. Supra note 15.
59. For a discourse on the goals see discussion infra pp.4-5.
60. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
61. Id. at 583.
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and brought suit.62 The District Court issued an injunction against the
government and prevented the Secretary of Commerce from continuing
the possession of the steel mills. 6 3 One of the issues the Supreme
Court addressed was whether the President possessed the constitu-
tional power to issue the Order.64 Justice Hugo Black penned the
majority decision, affirming the lower court's ruling and holding Presi-
dent Truman's Order unconstitutional. 6 5 Five other Justices wrote
separate concurring opinions: Robert Jackson, Felix Frankfurter, Wil-
liam 0. Douglas and Harold Burton concurred (joining Black in the
opinion, but still writing separately), with Associate Justice Tom Clark
concurring in the judgment but not in the opinion.66 Three Justices -
Chief Justice Fred Vinson and Associate Justices Stanley Reed and
Sherman Minton - joined in a dissenting opinion penned by the Chief
Justice.67
In the time since the Supreme Court decided Youngstown, Jus-
tice Jackson's concurrence "has become the touchstone which the
Supreme Court and legal commentators have employed to assess sepa-
ration of powers questions that have arisen[.]" 68 Thus, most
contemporary analyses of Presidential power use Justice Jackson's
concurrence, not Justice Black's majority opinion.69 The foundation of
Justice Jackson's opinion is the three-pronged approach to test Presi-
dential power - absent express Constitutional mandate, Presidential
inherent power is found or not found in three situations: (1) when the
President "acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Con-
gress, his authority is at its maximum", (2) when the President "acts in
absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can
only rely upon his independent powers," but this power lies within a
twilight zone where Congress may have concurrent authority and (3)
when the President acts "incompatible with the express or implied will
of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb."70 While expressing his
fears that the typical judicial characteristic of "dealing with the largest
62. Id.
63. Id. at 584.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 588.
66. See id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring), id. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring), id.
at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring), id. at 655 (Burton, J., concurring), id. at 660 (Clark, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
67. Id. at 667 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
68. Christopher Bryant and Carl Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, 29 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 373, 416 (alteration in original).
69. Id.
70. 343 U.S. at 635-39 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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questions in the most narrow way" would eventually upset the balance
of power in the United States,7 1 Justice Jackson created one of the
most concise definitions of any rule promulgated by the Supreme
Court.72
The three "over-simplified"7 3 situations imagined by the Justice
are fairly plain to analyze. Under the first situation, the President
utilizes maximum authority when acting with express or implied grant
from Congress.7 4 Thus, if Congress passes an act, either giving the
President authority or the President acts in concert with some Con-
gressional act, his power is at its greatest and such acts "executed by
the President ... .]would be supported by the strongest of presumptions
and the widest latitude of interpretation, and the burden of persuasion
would rest heavily upon any who might attack it."75 When Congress is
silent and the President acts, his actions fall under the twilight zone of
Presidential power.76 Thus, Congressional silence may "enable, if not
invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility" and any
test of such Presidential exercise "is likely to depend on the impera-
tives of events[. . .]rather than on abstract theories of law."7 7 In the
third situation, the President acts in opposition to the express or im-
plied Congressional will, such an act falls into the "lowest ebb" of the
President's power.78 Thus, the incompatible act "must be scrutinized
with caution" because, as the Justice warns, "what is at stake is the
equilibrium established by our constitutional system."79
Using his own framework, Justice Jackson quickly eliminated
the first two situations.80 The United States government admitted, "no
congressional authorization exists for this seizure."81 Thus, the first
situation is eliminated. Justice Jackson disposed of the second situa-
tion with equal promptness, finding that Congress had acted with
three statutes inconsistent with the seizure. 82 Therefore, Congress
was not silent. The Justice further admonished the President for his
claim that Congress failed to act specifically "upon the occasions,
71. Id. at 634-35 (Jackson, J., concurring).
72. See generally, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373.
73. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 636 (Jackson, J., concurring) (alteration in original).
76. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
77. Id. (alteration in original).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 638-39 (Jackson, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 639 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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grounds and methods for seizure of industrial properties," thus creat-
ing the requisite Congressional silence. 83
With the prompt dismissal of the first two situations, Justice
Jackson turned his attention to the third situation. 84 In this case, the
Justice dictated that the only way the President's Order would survive
scrutiny would be if the seizure was "within his domain and beyond
control by Congress."85 To begin, Justice Jackson reminded the reader
that the President indeed possesses inherent powers; not simply those
delegated to him by the Constitution." To hold such rigid views of
power would render clauses of the Constitution "unworkable, as well as
immutable."8 7 Justice Jackson then analyzed three specific conten-
tions of the Solicitor General in order to determine if the authority to
seize the steel mills fell within the President's domain.88 Justice Jack-
son dismissed the first of the Solicitor General's contentions - the
Constitution granted all executive powers within the governments ca-
pabilities to the President - with the same vigor used to dispose of the
first two "situations".8 9 The Justice referred to the first contention, as
within "the prerogative exercised by George III", and questioned that
the forefathers created the executive power in George's image.90 The
Solicitor General then argued that the President had power as Com-
mander-in-Chief to order the seizures.91 Justice Jackson quickly
eliminated this argument as well, finding that while the President pos-
sesses fairly broad power as Commander-in-Chief to deal with foreign
entities, when the President uses that power domestically, "not be-
cause of rebellion but because of a lawful economic struggle between
industry and labor, it should have no such indulgence."92 Finally, Jus-
tice Jackson eliminated the third argument, which was the "take care"
clause of Article 1193 - the seizures were done to faithfully execute the
law.9 4 The Justice asserted that in the context of the seizures, the
83. Id.
84. See Id. at 640-653 (Jackson, J., concurring).




89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 641 (Jackson, J., concurring).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 645 (Jackson, J., concurring).
93. "He shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. . ." see U.S.CONST. art. II,
s. 3.
94. 343 U.S. at 646 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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Fifth Amendment due process guarantee9 5 must counter any faithful
execution and thus the assertion of "take care" power to seize steel
mills failed in the face of the Fifth Amendment.96 In an argument of
last resort to find implied Presidential power, the Solicitor General
premised the seizures on non-specific and "nebulous, inherent powers
never expressly granted but said to have accrued to the office from the
customs and claims of preceding administrations."9 7 Justice Jackson
promptly disposed of this argument, finding that if the Framers wished
to give the President express power to confront national crises they
would have done so.98 With the absence of express constitutional au-
thority, coupled with the finding of express Congressional
incompatibility with the use of seizures,9 9 Justice Jackson determined
that the President exceeded his power.100
C. The "State Secrets" Privilege
The "State Secrets" privilege is an evidentiary rule that traces
its origins to the English common law.1 01 In the United States, the
leading state secrets privilege case is United States v. Reynolds.10 2 In
Reynolds, the wives of three civilian observers killed when an Air Force
bomber crashed sought relief under the Federal Torts Claim Act.103
During discovery, the plaintiffs moved for the government to produce
the "Air Force's official accident investigation report and the state-
ments of the three surviving crew members, taken in connection with
the official investigation." 1 0 4 The government objected on grounds
other than "state secrets", but the District Judge determined that good
cause existed to grant the plaintiffs' discovery requests.105 Shortly af-
ter the decision, the Secretary of the Air Force wrote to the District
Court refusing to comply with the discovery requests and asserting
that compliance with the requests would not be in the public inter-
95. "No person shall be.. .deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.. See U.S.CoNsT. amend. V.
96. 343 U.S. at 646 (Jackson, J., concurring).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 650 (Jackson, J., concurring).
99. See discussion infra p. 12.
100. 343 U.S. at 646 (Jackson, J., concurring).
101. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953).
102. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
103. Id. at 3.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 4.
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est.106 At rehearing, the Secretary then furnished a "Claim of
Privilege", stating once again that furnishing the crash report would
"seriously hamper national security," among other concerns. 07 The
District Court, however, continued to order production of the docu-
ments.108 Eventually, the case reached the Supreme Court, where the
Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Vinson, ruled that the Air Force
could properly assert the state secrets privilege but declined to dismiss
the action because facts about the crash could be discovered through
different means 109
Chief Justice Vinson's opinion set out a clear guide for when the
privilege applies. The state secrets privilege belongs solely to the Gov-
ernment.110 The privilege cannot be claimed nor waived by any private
party."' In order for the Government to claim the privilege, the head
of the department with control of the information must file a formal
claim of privilege, after carefully and personally considering its invoca-
tion.112 As the Chief Justice warned, the privilege "is not to be lightly
invoked."11 3 In addition, the Court stated that although judicial dis-
cretion exists to determine the use of the privilege,114 when "the
occasion for the privilege is appropriate.. .the court should not jeopard-
ize the security which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting
upon an examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in cham-
bers.""s5 The integrity of the privilege should thus be maintained. As
to the depth of inquiry into the appropriateness of invoking the privi-
lege, the Court said, "[w]here there is a strong showing of necessity,
the claim of privilege should not be lightly accepted . . . [but] where
necessity is dubious, a formal claim of privilege, made under the cir-
cumstances of this case, will have to prevail."" 6 The Chief Justice
then warned, "even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the
claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military
secrets are at stake."" 7 The depth of the inquiry, therefore, depends
106. Id.
107. Id. at 4-5.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 12.
110. Id. at 7.
111. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 7.
114. "Judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of
executive officers." See Id. at 9-10.
115. Id. at 10.
116. Id. at 11 (alteration in original).
117. Id.
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ultimately on the circumstances of each separate case, but even when
circumstances show that the necessity for information is high, the as-
sertion of military secrets trumps that necessity.
A higher profile case that dealt with the state secrets privilege
and set out another important aspect of the privilege was Ellsberg v.
Mitchell."" Ellsberg involved the "Pentagon Papers" controversy.119
Daniel Ellsberg leaked sensitive information to the New York Times,
detailing how Presidential administrations from Dwight D. Eisen-
hower through Richard M. Nixon misled the American public about the
progress (or lack thereof) of the military action in the Vietnam War.120
Ellsberg later sued the government, alleging Constitutional violations
stemming from secret electronic wiretapping. 121 During the suit, as in
Reynolds, a dispute arose surrounding certain pieces of evidence in-
cluded in a discovery request. 122 The Government filed four privilege
claims per Reynolds and attempted to answer the plaintiffs' requests
as fully as possible. 123 The Plaintiffs, however, were unsatisfied and
compelled further responses, but the District Court ruled that the evi-
dence was protected by the privilege. 124 As a result, the Government
filed a motion in limine and received a partial final judgment, subject
to appellate review. 125 The United States Court of Appeals ruled that
the privilege applied to all evidence in question except for the names of
Attorneys General who authorized the wiretaps.126
Ellsberg followed precisely the instruction given by the Su-
preme Court in Reynolds as to how to handle a state secrets
proceeding. 127 In addition, Ellsberg clearly defined the consequences
of a successful privilege claim. 128 The Court of Appeals found the "suc-
cessful assertion [of the privilege] may be fatal to the underlying case"
because the evidence prohibited by the privilege may prevent the
118. 709 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
119. In the context of this article, the use of Ellsberg is particularly ironic, Wikileaks
uses the example of Daniel Ellsberg as the inspiration behind the concept of Wikileaks. See
supra note 15. But see Derek E. Bambauer, Consider the Censor, 1 WAKE FOREST J.L. &
POL'Y _ (2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1757890. (Arguing critical ethical and
practical differences between Wikileaks and Daniel Ellsberg render any positive connection
between the two false).
120. 1 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y at .
121. 709 F.2d 51 at 53.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 55.
124. Id. at 56.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 60.
127. Id. at 56-58.
128. Id.
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plaintiff from establishing a prima facie case. 129 Therefore, any suc-
cessful assertion of the privilege will, in all likelihood, end a challenge
brought against the government. These pronouncements by the Su-
preme Court and the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, establish
the state secrets privilege. 30
III. PRESIDENTIAL POWER AT ITS HIGHEST
As previously discussed, the President should take a course of
action to cut off the flow of information from potential uploaders to the
website.13a With Youngstown in mind, however, the President must
first find an authority on which to base his actions. The President's
actions should be directed toward the leakers from within the United
States. Even though Wikileaks hosts on servers in Sweden and can be
accessed almost anywhere an internet connection is available1 32, use of
the broad foreign relations power afforded to the President does not
solve the internal nature of leaking documents. Therefore, the Presi-
dent cannot rely upon the broad foreign relations powers. Although
Wikileaks has posted countless volumes of United States military doc-
uments, the President cannot use his power as Commander-in-Chief,
because to do so would be contrary to Justice Jackson's warnings about
the use of such power "turned inwardly."133 With little Constitutional
authority left on which the President can rely, he should then find his
authority in a Congressional act.
A. The Authority: The National Security Act 34
The President can find a limited amount of authority to act
against Wikileaks within certain provisions of the NSA.135 Subchapter
V provides authority for the President to instruct the heads of the re-
spective intelligence agencies to take measures necessary to prevent
unauthorized disclosure of classified operational files. 136 Subchapter
V, entitled "Protection of Operational Files", empowers the Directors of
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)13 7, the National Geospatial-In-
129. Id. (alteration in original).
130. See 345 U.S. 1, See also United States v. Reynolds, 709 F.2d 51 (1953).
131. See discussion infra. p. 9.
132. See discussion infra. p. 6.
133. See discussion infra. p. 14.
134. 50 U.S.C. Ch. 15 (2005).
135. 50 U.S.C. §§431-432 (2005).
136. Id.
137. 50 U.S.C. §431.
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telligence Agency (NGA)13 , the National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO) 139 and the National Security Agency1 40, with the cooperation of
the Director of National Intelligence, to exempt their respective "opera-
tional files" from the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 141
"which require [s] publication, disclosure, or search or review in connec-
tion therewith."142 The NSA defines "operational files" generally as
the files of each agency that "document the means by which foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence is collected through scientific or
technical means."' 43 In other words, the documents that detail how
intelligence and counterintelligence was obtained may be exempt from
disclosure and remain classified.1 44
Besides operational files, the NSA imposes criminal liability for
those who leak information regarding the identities of undercover in-
telligence officers, informants, agents and sources. 145 The NSA
imposes punishments according to the level of information clearance
that the leaker possesses. 146 For instance, anyone who has direct ac-
cess to the information that identifies undercover entities and
intentionally disseminates such information is subject to fine and im-
prisonment for no fewer than 10 years. 147 Those with access to other
classified information, however, who happen to learn the identity of an
undercover entity and intentionally disseminate the information are
subject to a fine and imprisonment for no fewer than five years.14 8 Re-
gardless of who exposes such information, Congress clearly intended to
keep such information classified, or it would not have imposed such
harsh penalties.
The NSA grants further authority to make it more difficult to
leak documents. 149 Subchapter VI, titled "Access to Classified Infor-
mation", details in part the procedures imposed upon the agency
directors to control access to classified information.150 Section 435 of
138. 50 U.S.C. §432.
139. 50 U.S.C. §432a.
140. 50 U.S.C. §432b.
141. 5 U.S.C. §552 (2009).
142. 50 U.S.C. §431(a). See also 50 U.S.C. §432(a). See also §432a(a). See also §432b(a)
(alteration in original).
143. 50 U.S.C. §431(b). See also 50 U.S.C. §432(a)(2)(A). See also §432a(a)(2)(A). See
also §432b(b).
144. Id.




149. 50 U.S.C. §435 (2002).
150. Id.
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Title 50 includes an express grant to the President "[to] establish pro-
cedures to govern access to classified information [that] shall be
binding upon all departments, agencies, and offices of the executive
branch of Government."1 5 1 The statute prescribes the minimum proce-
dures to determine access to classified information, such as
background investigations 15 2 and financial disclosure.5a In an effort
to maintain fairness, the statute also directs agency directors who re-
voke access to give appropriate notice to the employee losing access. 154
The NSA, however, also includes a catchall provision, giving authority
to deny or terminate access to classified information if national secur-
ity so requires.155 The agency director may only use this power when
following the procedures for revocation of access would be inconsistent
with national security.156
The last grant of Congressional authority can be derived from
FOIA.' 57 FOIA created a list of nine exceptions to the rule that govern-
ment agencies were to provide information to the American public and
established a system by which Americans could access government
documents.s58 The foremost exception grants the President authority
to exempt from FOIA information "to be kept secret in the interest of
national defense or foreign policy."15 9 In addition, the President must
properly classify exempt information controlled by the Executive Or-
der.160 Another important exemption, Exemption 3, applies to
information specifically exempted in another statute. 6 1 For instance,
the files exempted by the NSA fall under Exemption 3. FOIA allows
the President to keep files unavailable to the public if the interests of
national security are best served or if a different statute prevents pub-
lic disclosure.162
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B. Applying Youngstown
Turning to Youngstown, the President can use the abovemen-
tioned sections of the NSA and FOIA to issue an Executive Order
placing greater restrictions on classified information.163 With greater
restrictions, the flow of information into a website such as Wikileaks
should slow down, or even cease. The NSA specifically exempts "opera-
tional files" from FOIA's government openness mandate. 164 Thus, any
properly written Executive Order maintaining the confidentiality of
CIA, NGA, NRO and National Security Agency operational files will
fall directly in line with Congressional intent.16 5 The FOIA national
security exemption also grants the President authorization to restrict
information that best serves national security interests. 166 Therefore,
the President may use an Executive Order to restrict information if it
protects national security.
The Congressional authority granted the President, however,
only extends so far in the context of the NSA. 167 The President can
only exempt information covered by the NSA; information possessed by
the CIA, NGA, NRO and National Security Agency.168 Thus, if the
President attempts to draft a similar Executive Order instructing, for
example, the Secretary of the Interior to restrict access to the Depart-
ment of the Interior's operational files, he most likely will exceed his
authority because no Congressional authority exists that would satisfy
Justice Jackson's first category.169 Although the NSA does not prevent
the dissemination of all information from the US government, it allows
the President to restrict dissemination from the US intelligence
agencies. 170
The method the President should employ to restrict information
leaks would be the issuance of an Executive Order instructing the di-
rectors of the agencies covered by the NSA to make security clearances
more difficult to obtain and keep. The Executive Order must follow at
least the minimum procedural requirements for issuance and mainte-
nance of a security clearance covered by the NSA. 171 Under Justice
163. 50 U.S.C. §431-432, 5 U.S.C. §552.
164. 50 U.S.C. §431(a). See also 50 U.S.C. §432(a). See also §432a(a). See also §432b(a).
165. Id.
166. 50 U.S.C. §552(b)(1)(A).
167. See 50 U.S.C. §431(a). See also 50 U.S.C. §432(a). See also §432a(a). See also
§432b(a).
168. See discussion infra. p. 19.
169. See supra note 3 (Jackson, J. concurring).
170. 50 U.S.C. §431-432
171. See 50 U.S.C. §435.
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Jackson's view of Presidential power, any act by the President in con-
travention of the Congressional mandated procedural requirements
would fall within the lowest realm of Presidential power. 172 The Exec-
utive Order will need, at least, provisions handling background checks
and financial disclosures during the period when an employee seeks a
higher security clearance and while the employee maintains that se-
curity clearance. 173 The President may, however, impose stricter
limits on the issuance of security clearances. 174 The President also
must ensure that the agency directors give appropriate notice should
they revoke an employee's security clearance.175 By following the pro-
cedural minimums, an Executive Order restricting security clearances
will be within the maximum of Presidential power as defined by Jus-
tice Jackson's Youngstown concurrence. 176 The Order should place
classified information in the hands of those the agency directors trust
the most, and the leaking of sensitive information onto Wikileaks
should cease.
IV. THE "TWILIGHT ZONE" AND THE "LOWEST EBB"
A. The Authority (or Lack Thereof): NSA and FOIA
FOIA contains no direct references to the State Department.177
Rather, the State Department falls under the broad definition of
"agency" under FOIA.a78 Exemption 1 of FOIA may apply to the State
Department, but it grants no specific affirmation of power from Con-
gress to the President.179 Exemption 3 does not apply in the Wikileaks
situation because no statute specifically exempts the State Depart-
ment's intra-department cables from FOIA.180 With no specific
172. 343 U.S. at 647 (Jackson, J. concurring)
173. See 50 U.S.C. §435(a)(1-4).
174. See §435(a).
175. See §435(a)(5).
176. 343 U.S. at 634-655 (Jackson, J. concurring)
177. See 5 U.S.C. §552.
178. 5 U.S.C. §552(f). ("[Algency' as defined. ..includes any executive department,
military department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other
establishment in the executive branch of the Government (including the Executive Office of
the President), or any independent regulatory agency") (alteration in original).
179. See 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(1)(A).
180. The Department of State has successfully claimed FOIA exemptions for files that
would endanger the intelligence gathering process. But the diplomatic cables released by
Wikileaks in 2010 do not mention the intelligence gathering process and are thus not
controlled by the FOIA precedent. See e.g. Agee v. Central Intelligence Agency, 524 F.Supp.
1290 (D.D.C. 1981).
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authority either granting or proscribing Presidential ability to control
information inside the State Department, action taken by the Presi-
dent to control State Department files falls into the twilight zone of
power.
Unlike the Department of Defense intelligence organizations
named throughout the NSA, the Department of State is seldom
named.181 When the State Department receives mention, it comes in
the form of a restriction on the ability to handle classified informa-
tion. 182 Under Section 435 of Title 50, the Director of the CIA must
certify that the State Department fully complies with directives cre-
ated by the Director himself for the handling, retention and storage of
classified materials.183 Thus, it appears that Congress did not intend
for the State Department to have much control over classifying
information.
Another aspect of the NSA worth noting deals with the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA). The DIA was initially included with the
group of Department of Defense intelligence agencies exempt from dis-
closure of operational files. 18 4 Much like its counterparts in the
Department of Defense, the Director of the DIA possessed the author-
ity to exempt operational files from disclosure under FOIA. 185 In 2007,
however, the section relating to the DIA was allowed to terminate.186
By allowing the DIA coverage in Section 432 to terminate, Congress
eliminated the DIA's authority to make decisions that could cut the
flow of information.187
B. Youngstown Applied, Again
Applying Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown, Presi-
dential power to alter the classification of information within the State
Department and the DIA falls under categories two and three: the twi-
light zone and the "lowest ebb". 18 The results, however, may end up
the same - the President lacks power to affect the information.
181. See 50 U.S.C. Ch. 15 (2005), see also discussion infra. pp. 19-22.
182. Limitation on handling, retention, and storage of certain classified materials by the
Department of State, 50 U.S.C. §435a (2000).
183. §435a(a).
184. 50 U.S.C. §432c, repealed. 2007. See also 50 U.S.C. §432. See also §432a.
185. §432c(a-b).
186. §432c.
187. See PL 109-163, 2006 HR 1815.
188. Id., see also Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 647 (Jackson,
J. concurring).
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Since FOIA is silent about the State Department, the Presi-
dent's ability to limit the flow of information falls within the twilight
zone. Thus, any Presidential action must be looked upon through the
individual circumstances of each case. The State Department docu-
ments leaked to Wikileaks were diplomatic cables detailing personal,
and often insulting, observations about foreign officials and situa-
tions.189 Essentially, the President would have to control the
classification of officially documented gossip. Although the presump-
tion of twilight zone issues leans towards permitting Presidential
power, action to halt the leaking of gossip will likely run afoul of the
First Amendment.190 Much like Justice Jackson's concern that the
seizure of steel mills will fly in the face of the Fifth Amendment Due
Process rights 91 , the information contained within the cables appears
to be little more than gossip, which falls short of most classified infor-
mation. Therefore, any Presidential restriction imposed on the State
Department would likely run counter to First Amendment guaran-
tees.192 Exercising Presidential power in the twilight zone to limit
access to information otherwise available under FOIS is precarious.
Thus, the leaking of diplomatic cables such as the December 2010
cables may continue with few impediments.
Should the President attempt to strengthen the classification of
State Department files under the NSA, the President will find himself
in the "lowest ebb" of his power. The President may be able to indi-
rectly influence the classification and handling of security clearances in
the State Department records through the provision granting the Di-
rector of the CIA control over such handling.193 That would be
indirect, however, and a direct mandate from the President to the Sec-
retary of State or any State Department agency heads would be
incompatible with Congress' intent.19 4 Congress stripped the State De-
partment of control over the handling of confidential information,
sending a clear message that the State Department was not to handle
classified materials unless approved by the CIA.195 An Executive Or-
der giving such authority to the State Department would thus run
189. At a glance: Wikileaks cables, BBC NEWS, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-us-canada-11914040.
190. See generally, U.S.CONST. amend. I.
191. See discussion infra. p. 14.
192. See generally, U.S. CONST. Amend. I.
193. 50 U.S.C. §435a. (emphasis added).
194. Id. see also Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 647 (Jackson, J. concurring).
195. 50 U.S.C. §435a
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contrary to the will of Congress.196 Therefore, such an order would
have a strong presumption against it.197
With regards to the DIA, the President would fall into the low-
est ebb of Presidential authority should he seek to restrict the
accessibility of DIA operational files. By repealing Section 432c, Con-
gress performed the negative act by omitting the DIA's ability to
exempt files from FOIA and thus maintaining the secrecy of such
files.198 Although the President could argue that the inaction by Con-
gress places this within the twilight zone of power - therefore giving
him the presumptive power to issue an Executive Order - the fact that
the DIA once possessed the power' 99 to limit the availability of opera-
tional files but was stripped of that power suggests that Congress no
longer intended for the DIA to possess this power. An Executive Order
instructing the Director of the DIA to further restrict DIA access to
operational files would run counter to Congress' withholding of the
power to classify.200 If the President has no power to promulgate such
an Executive Order, Wikileaks remains free to publish these
documents.
V. How CONGRESS MAY GRANT MORE POWER
Having determined that the President has either the tenuous
power of the twilight zone or no power at all to instruct the State De-
partment or the DIA to exert greater control over their own documents,
the question is then what can Congress do to address the situation?
With no express Constitutional authority, the President needs Con-
gressional authorization to avoid finding confidential information from
the State Department and DIA uploaded to Wikileaks. 201
For the DIA, the grant of power is rather simple; reinstate sec-
tion 432c of the NSA. Reinstatement of the statute would give the DIA
the same ability to exempt its operational files that it once shared with
its Department of Defense counterparts. 20 2 With regard to the ability
to make security clearances more difficult to obtain, the DIA is in-
cluded with its counterparts in the NSA. 2 03 Thus, the President may
196. See discussion infra. pp. 24-26.
197. See 343 U.S. at 647.
198. See 50 U.S.C. §432c.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See generally, Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 647
(Jackson, J., concurring).
202. See 50 U.S.C. §431-432.
203. Id.
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direct the DIA to make security clearances more difficult to obtain and
keep.204 The concern for the DIA is the sudden loss of its ability to
maintain the secrecy of their operational files and how to get that
power back, thus making it more difficult for such information to
upload to Wikileaks.
The State Department is a different matter since there is no
statute to reinstate. Instead, a new statute must be created. The stat-
utes of Subchapter V of Chapter 15 of Title 50 provide a good template
to model such a statute. The statute should look similar to thiS2 05:
Operational Files of the Department of State
(a) Exemption by Secretary of State
The Secretary of State may exempt operational files of the Depart-
ment of State from the provisions of section 552 of title 5 (Freedom
of Information Act) which require publication or disclosure, or
search or review in connection therewith.
(b) "Operational files" defined
In this section the term "operational files" means the files of the
Department of State that document the conduct of foreign relations
officers pertaining to the legal functions of the Department of State.
(c) Search and review for Information
Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, exempted opera-
tional files shall continue to be subject to search and review for
information concerning-
(1) United States citizens or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent
residence who have requested information on themselves pursuant
to the provisions of section 552 of Title 5 (Freedom of Information
Act) or section 552a of Title 5 (Privacy Act of 1974);
(2) any special activity the existence of which is not exempt from
disclosure under the provisions of section 552 of Title 5
(Freedom of Information Act); or
(3) the specific subject matter of an investigation by the congres-
sional committees, the Department of Justice, Office of the Legal
Adviser of the Department of State, Office of General Counsel of the
Office of Inspector General of the Department of State, or the Office
of Investigation of the Department of State for any impropriety, or
violation of law, Executive Order, or Presidential directive in the
conduct of a foreign relations activity.
(d) Information derived or disseminated from exempted
operational files
204. Id.
205. This sample statute is based heavily off 50 U.S.C. §431 (2005). The author would
like to credit the drafters of §431 for providing the template and structure that this sample
statute is based. In addition, this sample statute skips over technical portions that would
be included otherwise (e.g. a supersedure clause).
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(1) Files that are not exempted under subsection (a) of this section
which contain information derived or disseminated from exempted
operational files shall be subject to search and review.
(2) The inclusion of information from exempted operational files in
files that are not exempted under subsection (a) of this section shall
not affect the exemption under subsection (a) of this section of the
originating operational files from search, review, publication, or
disclosure.
(3) Records from exempted operational files which have been dis-
seminated to and referenced in files that are not exempted under
subsection (a) of this section and which have been returned to ex-
empted operational files for sole retention shall be subject to search
and review.
(f) Allegation; improper withholding of records;
judicial review
Whenever any person who has requested agency records under sec-
tion 552 of Title 5 (Freedom of Information Act) alleges that the
Department of State has improperly withheld records because of
failure to comply with any provision of this section, judicial review
shall be available under the terms set forth in section 552(a)(4)(B)
of Title 5, except that-
(1) in any case in which information specifically authorized under
criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of national defense or foreign relations which is filed with,
or produced for, the court by the Department of State, such infor-
mation shall be examined ex parte, in camera by the court;
(2) the court shall, to the fullest extent practicable, determine is-
sues of fact based on sworn written submissions of the parties;
(3) when a complaint alleges that requested records were improp-
erly withheld because of improper placement solely in exempted
operational files, the complainant shall support such allegation
with a sworn written submission, based upon personal knowledge
or otherwise admissible evidence;
(4)(A) when a complainant alleges that requested records were im-
properly withheld because of improper exemption of operational
files, the Department of State shall meet its burden under section
552(a)(4)(B) of Title 5 by demonstrating to the court by sworn writ-
ten submission that exempted operational files likely to contain
responsive records currently perform the functions set forth in sub-
section (b) of this section; and
(B) the court may not order the Department of State to review the
content of any exempted operational file or files in order to make
the demonstration required under subparagraph (A) of this para-
graph, unless the complainant disputes the Department of State's
showing with a sworn written submission based on personal knowl-
edge or otherwise admissible evidence;
(5) in proceedings under paragraphs (3) and (4) of this subsection,
the parties shall not obtain discovery pursuant to rules 26 through
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36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except that requests for
admission may be made pursuant to rules 26 and 36;
(6) if the court finds under this subsection that the Department of
State has improperly withheld requested records because of failure
to comply with any provision of this section, the court shall order
the Department of State to search and review the appropriate ex-
empted operational file or files for the requested records and make
such records, or portions thereof, available in accordance with the
provisions of section 552 of Title 5 (Freedom of Information Act),
and such order shall be the exclusive remedy for failure to comply
with this section; and
(7) if at any time following the filing of a complaint pursuant to this
subsection the Department of State agrees to search the appropri-
ate exempted operational file or files for the requested records, the
court shall dismiss the claim based upon such complaint.
Such a statute empowers the State Department to exercise con-
trol and maintain the confidentiality of its own statutorily defined
operational files. By defining the operational files under section (b),
the State Department has control over a large portion of its own
files.2 0 6 Use of the term "legal" reminds the State Department that
only legal communications may be exempted from FOIA requests. 2 0 7
Section (c) provides for exceptions, namely information regarding State
Department employees under investigation for illegal activities, leav-
ing State Department employees to answer for their misconduct. 2 0 8
Section (d) allows information that may not be exempted, but con-
tained in documents with exempted information, to be subject to FOIA
requests.209 Section (d) also allows for the exempted information that
comingles with non-exempted information to remain subject to exemp-
tion, keeping the confidentiality of documents intended to remain
classified. 210 Section (f) assures that mistaken exemption is easily cor-
rected by judicial review but maintains the confidentiality of files that
would damage national security interests. 2 1 1 The President could then
rely upon a statute as described above to create an Executive Order
instructing the Secretary of State to take measures to keep operational
files of the State Department classified. 2 1 2 Such an order would fall in
line with Congressional intent contained within the statute and place
206. See §(b) infra. p. 29.
207. Id.
208. See §(c) infra. p. 29.
209. See §(d) infra. p. 30.
210. Id.
211. See §(f) infra. p. 30.
212. Id.
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the order in the highest realm of Justice Jackson's vision of Presiden-
tial power.213 By limiting the access available for operational files, it
should become much more difficult for Wikileaks to obtain sensitive
government documents meant to remain confidential.
VI. THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE
If the President takes the above recommended course,
Wikileaks will struggle to publish classified information about the
United States at the same rate as previously. That, however, does not
mean Wikileaks, or its supporters, will go without a fight. On the con-
trary, Wikileaks and its supporterS214 may bring suit, challenging the
Presidential exercise of power and alleging First Amendment viola-
tions. The state secrets privilege will pose an additional and critical
impediment to their lawsuits.215
As discussed in Part I.C., the state secrets privilegre is an evi-
dentiary rule designed to prevent the release, during litigation
discovery, of classified documents that would threaten national secur-
ity.2 16 In a potential lawsuit alleging First Amendment freedom of
press violations, the state secrets privilege will prevent plaintiffs from
making a prima facie case for violation. 217 The head of the department
from which Wikileaks would seek discovery must file a formal claim of
privilege and follow the procedures Chief Justice Vinson set out for in-
vocation of the privilege. 2 18 Once followed, it will be up to the judge to
decide whether the privilege applies or not.2 19 Wikileaks most likely
would assert that the necessity for the information is high, because it
is the evidence necessary for Wikileaks to make a case that their free-
dom of press rights were violated. Thus, the Court would carefully
scrutinize the assertion of the privilege. 220 If the lawsuit centers on
the desire to leak military documents, the assertion of military secrets
would trump any assertion of necessity on the part of Wikileaks.221 If
the lawsuit centers on non-military issues, such as diplomatic files,
213. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (Jackson,
J., concurring).
214. For the purposes of this article, we will assume arguendo that the supporters have
standing to bring suit.
215. See discussion infra. pp. 15-18.
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Wikileaks' necessity argument would hold a strong advantage. The
government, however, could assert that given the damaging nature of
the previous Wikileaks US diplomatic leaks and the importance of
healthy foreign diplomatic relations to national security, the privilege
must still apply. While a close call, the government assertion of the
state secrets privilege would be reasonable and not conspicuous, and in
all likelihood, would succeed in preventing discovery and ending litiga-
tion against the US during the pre-trial phase.
Wikileaks may argue that to prevent discovery of leaked docu-
ments on account of the state secrets privilege is pointless because the
"cat's already out of the bag." Executive Order No. 13526 states, how-
ever, "[c]lassified information shall not be declassified automatically as
a result of any unauthorized disclosure of identical or similar informa-
tion."2 22 In other words, information meant to be classified remains
classified, even if leaked onto a website such as Wikileaks. Thus,
Wikileaks' possible attempts to force discovery because the information
is technically no longer secret will fail.
VII. CONCLUSION
In late 2006, Julian Assange and his crew of "Chinese dissi-
dents, etc." created Wikileaks with the purpose of exposing
government and corporate documents, intended to remain confidential,
to the worldwide public.223 Over the next four years, Wikileaks re-
leased countless diplomatic and military documents that have proved
embarrassing and detrimental to US interests. 224 Wikileaks has de-
veloped a series of technological protections that make direct action on
the website, such as interception of documents before upload or tracing
users to their locations, nearly impossible. 225 Wikileaks, however, can-
not exist without two important elements: users and information. 226
Today, after four years of embarrassment and fruitless efforts to halt
the flow of information into Wikileaks by other means, the time has
come for Presidential intervention that will severely damage the flow
of information into Wikileaks; an indirect attack on the website but a
direct attack on the ability to upload from within the US government.
Presidential power, however, cannot exist without authority.
The Constitution appears to provide little power to the President to
222. Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009) (alteration in original).
223. See discussion infra. p. 4.
224. See discussion infra. pp. 7-8.
225. See discussion infra. pp. 6-7.
226. See discussion infra. pp. 9-10.
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confront Wikileaks. Using Justice Robert Jackson's concurring opinion
in Youngstown, the President can find implied power by acting in con-
cert with Congressional intent. The President can use affirmative
Congressional authorization, found in the National Security Act, to di-
rect the heads of select intelligence agencies to exempt their respective
operational files from public disclosure, thus strengthening the files'
status as confidential. 2 27 The President has further authority within
the NSA to make the process of granting and keeping security clear-
ances significantly more difficult, thereby placing sensitive secret
documents in the hands of individuals the agency directors trust the
most. These individuals will be screened and scrutinized to ensure
they are not internal security risks and are least likely to ever leak
information to any outside source, including Wikileaks. 228 Without
sources who possess high security clearances, Wikileaks would lose ac-
cess to the sensitive information it covets as well as lose website
visitors due to the lack of desired leaked documents.
Presidential power does not extend into all areas of the govern-
ment that have experienced, or are vulnerable to, breaches onto
Wikileaks. FOIA's silence with regards to the Department of State
places any action into Justice Jackson's twilight zone of power, a zone
where the President has presumptive authority. Potential for First
Amendment violations, however, may prove the President has no such
power in spite of FOIA's silence. Furthermore, under the NSA, in-
structing the Secretary of State to take control of classified materials
would be incompatible with Congressional intent.229 Congress drafted
the NSA to give the Director of the CIA the ability to supervise and
ultimately be responsible for the handling of classified files inside the
State Department. 230 Thus, an instruction to the Secretary of State to
classify State Department files would run contrary to Congressional
intent.231 With respect to the DIA, Congress purposely allowed the ter-
mination of the statute granting similar authority given to the other
Department of Defense intelligence organizations to classify docu-
ments.232 By this withdrawal of authority, Congress expressed its
intent that the DIA was not to exempt their operational files from
227. See discussion infra. pp. 19-22.
228. See discussion infra. pp. 22-24.
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FOIA.2 3 3 Therefore, any Presidential instruction to restrict access to
operational files of the DIA is incompatible with Congress' will.
Congress may authorize the President to affect the classifica-
tion of information within the DIA and State Department. 234 Congress
may reenact the portion of the NSA that originally granted FOIA Ex-
emption 3 status to DIA operational files. 2 35 Congress may also draft
legislation, similar to the abovementioned draft, which would give sim-
ilar ability to the State Department to ensure that its own sensitive
documents may legally become more classified.
Finally, should a dispute arise and Wikileaks bring suit based
upon First Amendment violations, any such case would fail at the
prima facie level. 2 3 6 The "State Secrets" privilege would prevent the
discovery of evidence necessary to establish that Wikileaks cannot pub-
lish the sensitive materials it typically publishes.237 Any attempt to
reason that leaked information can be discovered because it is no
longer a "secret" also fails, because past Executive Orders dictate that
classified information remains so even after a leak.
While these proposals are not foolproof, if the President follows
Youngstown and the path described in this article, he may be able to
legally and constitutionally stop the dissemination of volumes of classi-
fied information by Wikileaks. This is by no means censorship, since
what ends up on the website is there, and cannot be taken down. But
by eliminating users and cutting off the flow of information onto the
website, Wikileaks will have less to post and little new to view. Inter-
est in the website would, in all likelihood, decline.
The President faces a tough but necessary decision to stop the
flow of information into Wikileaks. But if decisions were not tough,
then Shakespeare's timeless lament would not be timeless at all. In
the case of Wikileaks, uneasy lies the hand that clicks the mouse.
VIII. EPILOGUE 23 8
In the months that passed between the original draft of this pa-
per and publication, a lot has happened to change the face of the
Wikileaks issue.
233. Id.
234. See discussion infra. pp. 28-33.
235. Id.
236. See discussion infra. pp. 33-35.
237. Id.
238. Given recent events, the author feels compelled to include this epilogue.
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On October 7, 2011, President Obama signed Executive Order
13587.239 Titled "Structural Reforms To Improve the Security of Clas-
sified Networks and the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of
Classified Information," Executive Order 13587, establishes a head of
each agency to appoint a senior official to oversee the safeguarding of
confidential communications. 240 The appointed official is tasked with
the implementation of programs designed to detect insider threats,
conduct internal reviews and assign staff to a "Classified Information
Sharing and Safeguarding Steering Committee".241 The Steering Com-
mittee is tasked with enforcing senior-level accountability, among
other responsibilities. 24 2 The Order creates the "Classified Informa-
tion Sharing and Safeguarding Office", which is tasked with providing
support to the Steering Committee, among other tasks.243 The Order
also grants to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the National
Security Agency the title of "Executive Agent for Safeguarding Classi-
fied Communications on Computer Networks".244 The Executive
Agents are charged with creating technical systems for the protection
of classified information, among other responsibilities. 245 Finally, the
Order creates the Insider Threat Task Force, an interagency program
designed "for deterring, detecting, and mitigating insider threats, in-
cluding the safeguarding of classified information from exploitation,
compromise, or other unauthorized disclosure, taking into account risk
levels, as well as the distinct needs, missions, and systems of individ-
ual agencies."246 It appears that Executive Order 13587 lays out the
groundwork to combat the flow of information into the Wikileaks
website. 247
October, 2011 also brought significant changes to Wikileaks.
Wikileaks founder Julian Assange announced that Wikileaks could no
longer publish classified documents. 248 Assange said that a blockade
of Wikileaks' financial resources by US companies "destroyed 95% of
239. 76 Fed.Reg. 63811 (Oct. 7, 2011).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 63812.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 63813.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Executive Order 13587 would also make a good topic for a companion article.
Although the portions relating to the Executive Agent can find authority in the
aforementioned National Security Act. See 50 U.S.C. Ch.15 (2005).
248. Struggling Wikileaks stops publishing classified files, BBC NEWS, at http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-15434493.
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[their] revenue." 2 4 9 The blockade, led by private actors, Bank of
America, Visa, MasterCard, PayPal and Western Union, caused the
loss of "tens of millions in [ ] donations at a time of unprecedented oper-
ational costs." 2 50 Sadly, the shut down lasted only a month251, but it
should leave an indelible mark on Wikileaks. Perhaps Julian Assange
may now appreciate the burdens of leadership and help make it easier
for the hand that clicks the mouse.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
